Causation and free will / Carolina Sartorio.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1 The grounds of freedom : The question about grounding -- The alternative-possibilities answer -- The actual-sequences answer : The positive grounding claim -- The role of causal facts - The claim that responsibility is grounded in causation -- The negative grounding claim -- The supervenience claim -- The scope of supervenience claim -- Conclusions. 2 The underlying metaphysics: the fundamentals: Part 1 The metaphysics behind the positive grounding claim : Omissions -- Overdetermination -- Conclusions. Part 2 The metaphysics behind the negative grounding claim : The threat to the negative grounding claim -- Apparent counterexamples to supervenience -- Fischer and Ravizza's view -- In defense of supervenience -- The extrinsicness of causation -- The argument from derivative responsibility -- Responsibility for outcomes -- Conclusions. 3 The underlying metaphysics: completing the picture : Lucky -- Difference-making -- Intrasitivity -- Conclusions -- The right kind of cause : Part 1 The appeal to reasons-sensitivity: a puzzle and some failed solutions : Reasons-sensitivity -- Another puzzle about Frankfurt cases -- Existing solutions to the puzzle: the main proposals -- Existing solutions to the puzzle: the main problems -- Part 2 Causal reasons-sensitivity : Toward a new solution to the puzzle -- First stage: neuroscientist-free scenarios -- Second sage: Frankfurt scenarios -- Causal reasons-sensitivity -- Filling in the details -- Conclusions. 5 Causal sources : Ultimacy arguments -- Direct arguments -- Manipulation arguments -- Conclusions. Conclusion. References -- Index.

The author argues that only the actual causes of our behavior matter to our freedom. Although this simple view of freedom clashes with most theories of responsibility, including the most prominent "actual sequence" theories currently on offer, the author argues for its truth. The key, she claims, lies in a correct understanding of the role played by causation in a view of that kind. causation has some important features that make it a responsibility-grounding relation, and this contributes to the success of the view. Also, when agents act freely, the actual causes are richer than they appear to be at first sight; in particular, they reflect the agents' sensitivity to reasons, where this includes both the existence of actual reasons and the absence of other (counterfactual) reasons. so acting freely requires more causes and quite complex causes, as opposed to fewer causes and simpler causes, and is compatible with those causes being deterministic. The book connects two different debates, the one on causation and the one on the problem of free will, in new and illuminating ways.