000			02823nam a22003377a 4500
001			12947
003			OSt
005			20250202100732.0
008			201123t20212021enk b 001 0 eng d
020			_a9780198868361 _q(hardback)
020			_a0198868367 _q(hardback)
040			_aYDX _beng _cYDX _erda _dIQ-MoCLU _dERASA _dCDX _dOCLCO _dOCLCF _dZYU _dUKMGB _dNTU _dDLC
082	0	4	_a110 _223 _bB171
100	1		_aBalaguer, Mark, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aMetaphysics, sophistry, and illusion : _btoward a widespread non-factualism / _cby Mark Balaguer
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_a UK : _b Oxford University Press, _c 2021.
264		4	_c©2021
300			_aix, 295 pages ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 275-286) and index.
520	8		_aMetaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion does two things. First, it introduces a novel kind of non-factualist view, and argues that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a wide class of metaphysical questions, most notably, the abstract-object question and the composite-object question. (More specifically, Mark Balaguer argues that there's no fact of the matter whether there are any such things as abstract objects or composite objects?or material objects of any other kind.) Second, Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion explains how these non-factualist views fit into a general anti-metaphysical view called neo-positivism, and explains how we could argue that neo-positivism is true. Neo-positivism is the view that every metaphysical question decomposes into some subquestions?call them Q1, Q2, Q3, etc.?such that, for each of these subquestions, one of the following three anti-metaphysical views is true of it: non-factualism, or scientism, or metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism. These three views can be defined (very roughly) as follows: non-factualism about a question Q is the view that there's no fact of the matter about the answer to Q. Scientism about Q is the view that Q is an ordinary empirical-scientific question about some contingent aspect of physical reality, and Q can't be settled with an a priori philosophical argument. And metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Q is the view that Q asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that's metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn't say anything about reality and, if it's true, isn't made true by reality.--
650		4	_aMetaphysics.
650		4	_aFallacies (Logic)
650		4	_aIllusion (Philosophy)
910			_asaja
942			_2ddc _cBK _n0
999			_c12947 _d12947