000			02181nam a22003017a 4500
001			13457
003			OSt
005			20250211102900.0
008			190806s20202020uk a b 001 0 eng d
020			_a9780198847717 _q(hardcover)
040			_aIQ-MoCLU _beng _erda _cYDX _d IQ-MoCLU _dYDXIT _dERASA _dOCLCF _dPTS _dGUA _dIL4J6 _dOCLCO _dOCL _dDLC
082	7	4	_a149.7 _223 _bC732
100	1		_aComesaña, Juan, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aBeing rational and being right / _cJuan Comesaña.
250			_aFirst edition.
264		1	_a Oxford, United Kingdom : _b Oxford University Press, _c 2020 .
300			_axii, 222 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages [213]-220) and index.
520	8		_a"In Being Rational and Being Right, Juan Comesaña argues for a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. His starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, Comesaña provides a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, which Comesaña calls "Experientialism," differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. He reasons that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. Comesaña embeds this discussion in a Bayesian framework, and discusses in addition the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña's own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism."--
650		4	_aRationalism.
650		4	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
910			_aASEEL
942			_2ddc _cBK _n0
999			_c13457 _d13457