000			03320cam a2200421 i 4500
001			19037
003			OSt
005			20240925095251.0
008			200901t20212021nyua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2020034295
020			_a9780197529812 _q(paperback)
020			_a9780197529805 _q(hardback)
020			_z9780197529836 _q(epub)
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dIQ-MoCUL
042			_apcc
050	0	0	_aHF1359 _b.G4688 2021
082	0	0	_a355.02/73 _223 _bG337
100	1		_aGent, Stephen E., _d1976- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aMarket power politics : _bwar, institutions, and strategic delay in world politics / _cStephen E. Gent and Mark J.C. Crescenzi.
264		1	_aNew York, NY : _bOxford University Press, _c[2021]
264		4	_c2021
300			_axv, 262 pages : _billustrations ; _c25 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
500			_aالغلاف مختلف عن صفحة العنوان
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 229-246) and index.
520			_a"This book explores how market power competition between states can create disruptions in the global political economy and potentially lead to territorial aggression and war. When a state's firms have the ability to set prices in a key commodity market like oil or natural gas, state leaders can benefit from increased revenue, stability, and political leverage. Given these potential benefits, states may be motivated to expand their territorial reach in order to gain or maintain such market power. This market power motivation can sometimes lead to war. However, when states are economically interdependent, they may be constrained from using force to achieve their market power goals. This can open up an opportunity for institutional settlements. However, in some cases, institutional rules and procedures can preclude states from reaching a settlement in line with their market power ambitions. When this happens, states may opt for strategic delay and try to gradually accumulate market power over time through salami tactics. To explore how these dynamics play out empirically, we examine three cases of market power competition in hard commodity markets: Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait to seize market power in the oil export market, Russia's territorial encroachment into Georgia and Ukraine to preserve and expand its market power in the natural gas market, and China's ongoing use of strategic delay and gray zone tactics in the South and East China Seas to maintain its dominant position in the global market for rare-earth elements"--
650		0	_aInternational economic relations.
650		0	_aNatural resources.
650		0	_aGlobalization _xEconomic aspects.
650		0	_aWar _xEconomic aspects.
700	1		_aCrescenzi, Mark J.C., _d1970- _eauthor.
776	0	8	_iOnline version: _aGent, Stephen E., _tMarket power politics _dNew York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] _z9780197529836 _w(DLC) 2020034296
910			_aاسيل ناظم
942			_2ddc _n0 _cBK
999			_c19037 _d19037