000			05005nam a22003617a 4500
001			30321
003			OSt
005			20250518124933.0
008			140724s2014 enk b 001 0 eng
020			_a9780199391752
020			_a9780197511787
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda
082	7	4	_a160.92 _223 _bM179
100	1		_aMaddy, Penelope, _eauthor.
245	1	4	_aThe logical must : _bWittgenstein on logic / _cPenelope Maddy.
264		1	_aOxford ; _aNew York : _bOxford University Press, _c[2014]
300			_a135 pages ; _c22 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent _btxt
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia _bn
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier _bnc
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: -- Preface -- Introduction -- I. Kant on logic -- II. Naturalizing Kant on logic -- III. The Tractatus -- IV. Naturalizing the Tractatus -- V. Rule-following and logic -- VI. But isn't logic special?! -- VII. Naturalizing the logical must -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index.
520			_a"The Logical Must is an examination of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, early and late, undertaken from an austere naturalistic perspective Penelope Maddy has called "Second Philosophy." The Second Philosopher is a humble but tireless inquirer who begins her investigation of the world with ordinary perceptual beliefs, moves from there to empirical generalizations, then to deliberate experimentation, and eventually to theory formation and confirmation. She takes this same approach to logical truth, locating its ground in simple worldly structures and our knowledge of it in our basic cognitive machinery, tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect those structures where they occur. In his early work Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein also links the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but he includes one key unnaturalistic assumption: that the sense of our representations must be given prior to-independently of-facts about how the world is. When that assumption is removed, the general outlines of the resulting position come surprisingly close to the Second Philosopher's roughly empirical account. In his later discussions of logic in Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Wittgenstein also rejects this earlier assumption in favor of a picture that arises in the wake of the famous rule-following considerations. Here Wittgenstein and the Second Philosopher operate in even closer harmony-locating the ground of our logical practices in our interests, our natural inclinations and abilities, and very general features of the world-until the Second Philosopher moves to fill in the account with her empirical investigations of the world and cognition. At this point, Wittgenstein balks, but as a matter of personal animosity rather than philosophical principle"--
520			_a"Maddy's short monograph looks at Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, from the perspective of the form of naturalism that she calls "second philosophy." That view takes an empirical approach to logical truth -- essentially arguing that if philosophers want to understand the world, they should start from a position informed by scientific understandings of the world, because science is often a reliable guide to how the world works. Similarly, just like science, logic is also grounded in the structure of our world, and our basic cognitive machinery is tuned by evolutionary pressures to detect that structure where it occurs. Ludwig Wittgenstein (particularly in the "Tractatus") also linked the logical structure of representation with the structure of the world, but still insisted that the sense of our representations must be given prior to -- independently of -- any facts about how the world happens to be. When that requirement is removed, Wittgenstein's position in the Tractatus approaches Maddy's Second Philosophy -- that logic is grounded in the structure of the world and our representational systems reflect that structuring. The later Wittgenstein also hews closely to Second Philosophy, holding that our logical practices are grounded in our interests and motivations, and our natural inclinations, and the features of the world. In this sense, logic is no different from other descriptions of the world -- just more general and responding to features so basic and ubiquitous that they tend to go unnoticed. Maddy's Second Philosophy finds Wittgenstein as an important precursor and kindred spirit, and promotes a new view of him as a naturalistic phliosopher"--
600	1	0	_aWittgenstein, Ludwig, _d1889-1951.
600	1	0	_aWittgenstein, Ludwig, _d1889-1951. _tTractatus logico-philosophicus.
600	1	0	_aKant, Immanuel, _d1724-1804.
650		4	_aLogic.
650		4	_aNaturalism.
910			_aSAJA
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c30321 _d30321