000 02540nam a22003257a 4500
001 5476
003 OSt
005 20250803103620.0
008 190426s2019 enk b 001 0 eng d
020 _a9780198793366
_qhardcover
020 _a9780192855336
_qpaperback
020 _z
_q
040 _aIQ-MoCLU
_beng
_cYDX
_erda
082 7 4 _a323.01
_223
_bC955
100 1 _aCruft, Rowan,
_eauthor.
245 1 0 _aHuman rights, ownership, and the individual /
_cRowan Cruft.
250 _aFirst edition.
264 1 _a New York, NY :
_b Oxford University Press,
_c 2019 .
300 _aix, 283 pages ;
_c24 cm
336 _atext
_btxt
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_bn
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_bnc
_2rdacarrier
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
520 8 _aIs it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify this concept's central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does it unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft brings together a new account of the concept of a right. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive role for the concept: it is appropriate to our thinking about fundamental moral duties springing from the good of the right-holder. This has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights-that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognising that they do. Cruft argues that only rights that exist primarily for the sake of the right-holder can qualify as natural in this sense.0In its relation to property, however, matters are far more complicated because much property is groundable only by common or collective goods beyond the right-holder's own good. For such property, Cruft argues that a non-rights property system-that resembles modern markets but is not conceived in terms of rights-would be preferable. The result of this study is a partial vindication of the rights concept that is more supportive of human rights than many of their critics (from left or right) might expect, and is surprisingly doubtful about property as an individual right.
650 4 _aHuman rights
_xPhilosophy.
910 _aSAJA
942 _2ddc
_cBK
_n0
999 _c5476
_d5476