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| 001 | 7079 | ||
| 003 | OSt | ||
| 005 | 20250304100031.0 | ||
| 008 | 170222s2017 nyu b 001 0 eng d | ||
| 020 |
_a9780198851035 _q |
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| 020 |
_a9780198717829 _qhardback |
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_a _q |
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_aIQ-MoCLU _beng _cYDX _erda _d IQ-MoCLU _dOCLCF _dSTF _dGZM _dWAU _dIUL _dDLC |
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| 082 | 7 | 4 |
_a170 _223 _bE37 |
| 100 | 1 |
_aEklund, Matti _eauthor. |
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| 245 | 1 | 0 |
_aChoosing normative concepts / _cMatti Eklund. |
| 250 | _aFirst edition. | ||
| 264 | 1 |
_aNew York : _b Oxford University Press, _c 2017. |
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| 264 | 4 | _c©2017 | |
| 300 |
_aix, 219 pages ; _c25 cm |
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| 336 |
_atext _btxt _2rdacontent |
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| 337 |
_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia |
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| 338 |
_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier |
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| 504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 207-215) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | _aArdent realism -- Alternative normative concepts -- Qualifications and objections -- Normative concepts -- Normative properties -- Presentationalism -- Being against what is plainly right -- Connections -- Thick concepts -- Some metaphilosophical issues -- Concluding remarks. | |
| 520 | 8 | _aTheorists working on metaethics and the nature of normativity typically study goodness, rightness, what ought to be done, and so on. In their investigations they employ and consider our actual normative concepts. But the actual concepts of goodness, rightness, and what ought to be done are only some of the possible normative concepts there are. There are other possible concepts, ascribing different properties. Matti Eklund explores the consequences of this thought, for example for the debate over normative realism, and for the debate over what it is for concepts and properties to be normative. Conceptual engineering - the project of considering how our concepts can be replaced by better ones - has become a central topic in philosophy. Eklund applies this methodology to central normative concepts and discusses the special complications that arise in this case. For example, since talk of improvement is itself normative, how should we, in the context, understand talk of a concept being better? | |
| 650 | 4 | _aNormativity (Ethics) | |
| 650 | 4 | _aMetaethics. | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 |
_zAvailable to Stanford-affiliated users. _uhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198717829.001.0001 _yOxford Scholarship Online |
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